![]() their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the "relational" or the "embodied" concept of emotional feeling. Since the person-environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person-environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. The James-Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes.
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